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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN P. VINANTI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030881-CA 
Comes now, the Defendant/Appellant, JOHN P. VINANTI, by and through 
his attorney of record, DANA M. FACEMYER, pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure Rule 24(c), provides this Reply to the Brief of the Appellee. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED STATEMENTS 
THAT WERE MADE IN RESPONSE TO CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION, AFTER THE DEFENDANT HAD REQUESTED 
AN ATTORNEY, AND WHILE THE DEFENDANT WAS 
INTOXICATED. 
In the Appellee's Brief the State argues the admission of Defendant's 
statements was not error for five reasons; 1] Defendant's claims are inadequately 
briefed, 2] Defendant invited evidence of incriminating nod, 3] Defendant was not 
in custody when asking the incriminating questions, 4] Defendant's questions 
were not the product of interrogation, and 5] Defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Aplee. Br. at 18, 19, 29, 35, and 42. 
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A. Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed 
Appellee argues that Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed in that 
Defendant failed to cite to the specific point in the record at which the 
"incriminating nod" was admitted into evidence, and Defendant failed to identify 
the specific "incriminating questions" and to cite were they were admitted into 
evidence." See Aplee. Br. at 18. 
Speaking of the acceptability of Appellate argument the Utah Supreme 
Court said that; "If [the argument is correct] in substance, it should be given effect 
and mere technical defects should not defeat the right of appeal. This is in accord 
with the generally desirable objective of not placing undue stress on technicalities 
where others are not adversely affected." Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 231 
(Utah, 1966). This Court set the bar at which an issue would be considered 
inadequately briefed by saying; "An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument 
to the reviewing court." Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, P8 (Utah Ct. App., 
1999)(internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the Utah courts have traditionally 
interpreted statutes regarding appellate procedure in a light favorable to ensuring 
that arguments are heard on their merits. "Statutes giving the right of appeal are 
liberally construed in furtherance of justice. Such an interpretation as will work a 
forfeiture of that right is not favored." U.P.C. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 
303, P28 (Utah Ct. App., 1999), quoting Price v. Western Loan & Sav. Co., 35 
Utah 379, 100 P. 677, 679 (1909). 
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In the current case counsel incorrectly cited to the wrong part of the record 
when discussing this issue. The fact that the "incriminating nod" took place and 
was entered into evidence in this case is not at question and is admitted by the 
State. See Aplee Br. at 19. And in fact the Appellant did cite to the courts 
decision to allow the "incriminating questions" to be entered into the record. See 
Aplt. Br. at 6. To dismiss any discussion of this issue due to a technical error 
would stand in opposition to the objectives of appellate procedure as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court of Utah by placing too much emphasis on technicalities in 
the face of pursuing justice. Furthermore, this technical deficiency does not reach 
the level set by this Court to determine inadequacy of briefing as it would not 
force the Court to take the burden of research and argument. The error is a 
technical error as to the citation of a fact that, as stated above, is accepted by both 
parties to the appeal. The argument surrounding the fact is adequate and is not 
criticized by the state for insufficiency. 
B. Defendant invited evidence of incriminating nod 
Appellee argues that Defendant invited introduction of the "incriminating 
nod" as the evidence was adduced during counsel's direct examination of 
defendant. See Aplee. Br. at 19. It must first be noted that the majority of the 
Appellant's argument surrounding the admittance of custodial evidence in 
opposition to Miranda deals with the statements made while Defendant was in 
custody at the hospital. The "incriminating nod" is only mentioned once through 
this discussion and a finding that evidence of an "incriminating nod" would not 
- 3 -
cause Appellant's brief to fail. However, as the initial court error deciding 
Defendant was not in custody throughout his hospitalization would include error 
that would have allowed evidence of the "incriminating nod/' it will be discussed 
in this brief. 
Appellee argues that counsel's "inviting" of the error occurred during the 
trial. Quoting the Supreme Court of Utah the Appellee argues; 
"We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take advantage of 
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error. This rule, which is known as the "invited error" 
doctrine, has two principal purposes. First, it fortifies our long-established 
policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the 
claim of error. Second, it discourages parties from intentionally misleading 
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah, 1993)(emphasis added). 
This is not a case in which defense counsel invited the court into error. 
There had been an evidentiary hearing in which it had already been decided that 
Defendant's statements would be allowed into evidence. (Reporter's Transcript 
July 15, 2003, at 48-51). The error as to the admittance of this evidence had 
already been made and defense counsel was forced to go to trial knowing that 
these statements would be admitted, and therefore developed a strategy in 
accordance. The question defense counsel asked and the response of the 
defendant do not meet the two justifications for enforcing a strict "invited error" 
rule. In this case the trial court did have the opportunity to decide the issue in the 
evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, the decision of the evidentiary hearing is the 
basis for the appeal and the source of the error and thus there would have been an 
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appealable issue regardless of whether the defense counsel had asked the 
"inviting" question. 
C. Defendant was in custody 
Appellee argues that Defendant's "incriminating questions" were properly 
admitted because Defendant was not in custody at the time he made the questions. 
See Aplee. Br. at 21 and 29. Based on four of the five factors set forth in State v. 
Gray, the Appellee justifies its argument that Defendant was not in custody by 
arguing that 1] the hospital setting was neutral, 2] the officer told defendant he 
was not in custody, 3] there was no indicia of arrest, and 4] any post-invocation 
questioning was limited to wellbeing. See Aplee. Br. 30, 32, 33, and 34. 
a. Hospital setting was not neutral 
Appellee argues that the hospital setting was neutral because it was not a 
police dominated atmosphere. See Aplee. Br. at 30. The Utah Supreme Court has 
set the standard by which to interpret custody by stating; "safeguards prescribed 
by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is 
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Utah, 1996). A site may be considered "neutral" when it is 
"substantially less police dominated that that surrounding the kinds of 
interrogation at issue in Miranda itself." See Aplee. Br. at 30 (quoting State v. 
East, 743 P.2d 1211, 1212 (Utah 1987). 
However, the hospital room in the current case can not be easily compared 
to the traffic stop that was considered "substantially less police dominated" in 
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East. Here, the defendant was in restraints, if even for only part of the time, in a 
hospital room, with one door that was being guarded by a police officer who had 
accompanied the suspect from the scene of a murder, which officer also felt the 
objective need to inform the suspect of his Miranda rights. The state has provided 
a handful of out of state decisions involving hospital setting interrogations which 
contain some of the aspects of the current fact pattern. However, with all of the 
facts that were present in this case, it is obvious that an objective person in the 
Defendants position would feel not only unable to leave the hospital room, but 
would feel restrained on par with arrest. 
A hospital room serves as a restraint on the average individual's freedom, 
and when this hospital room also became dominated by the presence of Officer 
Mitchell that restraint reached the level of arrest. The average person admitted to 
a hospital would feel that they are unable to leave without appropriate 
consultation with medical staff. This restraint is not legal custody but obviously 
compounds any determination of restraint in the Miranda setting. Here, however, 
the inherent restraints of a hospital room were compounded by the presence of a 
police officer which dominated the entire medical experience for the Defendant. 
The Defendant was accompanied from the scene of a crime by the officer. The 
Officer was a constant presence in the room, either by his actual presence, or by 
the knowledge that the officer was watching the single access door to the room. 
In addition to his physical domination of the hospital room, the air of domination 
was heightened when the officer saw fit to give Defendant of the "casual" 
- 6 -
Miranda rights. This exchange would obviously create in any individual the 
impression that their movement would be restrained at a level equivalent with 
arrest. 
b. Telling a suspect that they are not in custody does not overcome 
obvious communications to the suspect that they are the focus of the 
investigation. 
Appellee argues that Defendant was not in custody because he was told he 
was not in custody. See Aplee. Br. at 32. One factor used in determining custody 
is whether it is communicated to the accused that he was the focus of the 
investigation. State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah app. 1993). The supreme 
court of Utah held that the focus must be communicated. State v. Mirquet, 914 
P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah, 1996). In Mirquet, the defendant was pulled over for a 
traffic violation and asked to step into the police vehicle to see the radar display. 
In the police vehicle the officer told the defendant that the officer suspected drug 
use and incriminating evidence was given by the defendant. The court found that 
the situation met the merits of the "focus of the investigation" factor because it did 
"not involve an unarticulated suspicion focused on [the defendant]." Id. 
Like the officer in Mirquet, Officer Mitchell amply communicated to 
Vinanti that he was the focus of the investigation. Officer Mitchell's actions and 
words would be more than enough to communicate to an objective witness that 
Vinanti was the focus of the investigation. The Officer traveled with Vinanti from 
the scene of the crime to the hospital, stayed in close proximity to him for several 
hours, questioned him about the crime, and informed the Defendant that he didn't 
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have to talk to him and that he had the right to an attorney. All of these actions 
and words would easily combine in the mind of a reasonable person that Vinanti 
was the focus of the investigation. 
c. Post-invocation questioning was not limited to wellbeing 
Appellee argues that "incriminating questions" were not the product of 
interrogation because the officer's communication with Defendant following 
Defendant's request for an attorney was limited to questions regarding 
Defendant's wellbeing. See Aplee. Br. at 34. This is simply not true. After the 
Defendant requested an attorney, not only did Officer Mitchell tell Defendant that 
he wanted to know "what happened as far as what's goin on up to the house and 
stuff," (Interview Report of Officer Mitchell, paragraphs 91-94) but also only a 
few moments later, while the subject was still fresh in the Defendant's mind, he 
said "Do you wanna talk?" (Id. at 114). After asking Defendant "what happened" 
and then asking if he wanted to talk, Officer Mitchell continued to discuss the 
events of the previous few days and to ask prompting questions, all after 
Defendant had clearly requested a lawyer. (Id. at 124-150). 
Officer Mitchell asked Vinanti questions about the incident. Then Officer 
Mitchell felt that the questioning had gotten to the point that Miranda rights 
should be given, even though he failed to adequately warn the Defendant of his 
Miranda rights. The Defendant then requested a lawyer, and Officer Mitchell 
continued to ask the Defendant to speak about the events of the previous few days. 
This was clearly an interrogation, during which the Defendant's requests were not 
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being accommodated. Clearly the nature of the questioning in depravation of the 
Defendant's desire for counsel lends serious weight to the fact that Defendant was 
in police custody at the time the "incriminating questions" were asked. 
D. Questions were not spontaneous, but were instead the product of custodial 
interrogation 
Appellee argues that "incriminating questions" were not the product of 
interrogation because they were spontaneous and not a result of questions made 
by the police. See Aplee. Br. at 35. "The term interrogation under Miranda refers 
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the 
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). 
In the current case, not only did Officer Mitchell ask the Defendant "what 
happened" concerning the tragic events of the previous few days, but Officer 
Mitchell also engaged the Defendant in prolonged conversation dealing with the 
nature of his relationship with the deceased and the events that preceded her 
death. (Interview Report of Officer Mitchell, paragraphs 114, 124-150). This is 
clearly interrogation by questioning, and interrogation by "actions on the part of 
police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response." The Defendant was clearly drunk, and Officer Mitchell's attempts at 
engaging the Defendant in conversation relating to his relationship to the deceased 
and the events preceding her death are clear attempt to ensure that the already 
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intoxicated and confused mind of the defendant would reveal something 
incriminating which could be used against him. 
E. Waiver of defendant's right to counsel was not knowing and intelligent 
Appellee argues that "incriminating questions" were admissible because 
Defendant impliedly had knowingly and intelligently waived his Right to Counsel 
as protected by Miranda, See Aplee. Br. at 39. It is the State's argument, and the 
law that to determine competency to knowingly and intelligently waive Miranda 
rights the police and the court must focus on the defendant's behavior at the time 
of the waiver. See State v. Orme, 677 So.2d 258, 262 (Fla. 1996), State v. 
Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422, 429 (Utah, 1998), and State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 
1239 (Utah, 1993). 
However, in opposition to the states position, and the testimony of the 
police, an analysis of the transcript of Officer Mitchell's tape recorded interview 
with the Defendant show's clearly that the Defendant's behavior exhibited an 
inability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Reading 
through the questions and responses from Officer Mitchell and the Defendant it is 
clear that Defendant was unable to concentrate on one subject for any substantial 
amount of time. He skips from subject to subject failing to answer direct 
questions from Officer Mitchell. In response to question's about the Defendant's 
attorney the defendant answers; "go[t] to pee." (Interview Report of Officer 
Mitchell, paragraph 73). He was even unconscious that he had a catheter 
attached. (Id. at 74-75). After a second request for attorney information the 
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defendant asked instead about the deceased. (Id. at 76-78). The pages of the 
interview surrounding the attempt at Miranda warnings jump from topic to topic 
without Officer Mitchell ever to clearly inform Defendant of his Miranda rights 
due to Defendant's inability to stay on topic. (Id. 34-150). 
Anyone who has had experience with intoxicated people can clearly see 
that Defendant is extremely drunk and unable to engage in coherent conversation. 
If someone is so drunk that their mental state disallows an Officer's attempt to 
inform that person of their Miranda rights, that person is clearly too drunk to 
waive the same. 
It is clear from the record and from case law that Defendant was in custody 
at the time of the "incriminating questions." The setting was dominated by the 
presence of Officer Mitchell, Officer Mitchell's investigation was clearly focused 
on the Defendant, and Officer Mitchell questioned and conversed with Defendant 
in a clear attempt to uncover incriminating facts. The "incriminating questions" 
were not spontaneous as the defendant was subject to interrogation at the time, 
and the state has not shown a clear break in causation between the Officer's 
clearly illegal questions and the statements that were brought out in trial. It is 
further clear, and not argued against by the state in the Appellee Brief, that Officer 
Mitchell was never able to give Defendant clear Miranda warnings. Because, 
warnings were not clearly given, and because Defendant's behavior clearly 
expressed that he was intoxicated beyond the ability to have coherent 
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conversation, it is clear that Defendant never knowingly and intelligently waived 
his Miranda rights after requesting an attorney. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED PLAINTIFF TO 
PRESENT EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS IN VIOLATION OF 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 404(B), WHICH ACTS WERE OVERLY 
PREJUDICIAL RATHER THAN PROBATIVE. 
Appellee argues that admission of Defendant's Prior Bad Acts was without 
error because Appellant failed to provide an adequate record for review. See 
Aplee. Br. at 44. "If [the argument is correct] in substance, it should be given 
effect and mere technical defects should not defeat the right of appeal. This is in 
accord with the generally desirable objective of not placing undue stress on 
technicalities where others are not adversely affected." Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 
2d 229, 231 (Utah, 1966). "Statutes giving the right of appeal are liberally 
construed in furtherance of justice. Such an interpretation as will work a forfeiture 
of that right is not favored." U.P.C. v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, P28 
(Utah Ct. App., 1999), quoting Price v. Western Loan & Sav. Co., 35 Utah 379, 
100 P. 677,679(1909). 
The Defendant was unable to site to the hearing at which the decision 
regarding Prior Bad Acts was decided because that hearing was not recorded. 
However, the Brief of the Appellant does cite to a specific place in a subsequent 
evidentiary hearing where the court specifically states which prior bad acts are 
going to be allowed into court. See Aplt Br. at 16. If the court does not hear this 
issue on the merits due to inadequacy of the record outside of the control of the 
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defendant, it will be against the objectives of the court and the intent of appeals 
that justice be ensured. The court can clearly see the prior bad acts from the 
record and has been given the appropriate law in the Appellant's brief. See Aplt 
Br. 16-18. This court should find that it has the ability to decide this case 
regardless of errors of record to fulfill the mandates of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should find that the trial court erred when it admitted 
"incriminating questions" made by the Defendant. These questions were made in 
response to custodial interrogation, after the defendant had requested an attorney, 
and while the defendant was intoxicated. 
The Court should find that the trial court erred when it allowed plaintiff to 
present evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b), 
which acts were overly prejudicial rather than probative. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thig^ ffi^day of Ut4fl$y , 2005. 
C_ DANA^I«ACEMYER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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